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Abstract
Background: Several stakeholders have undertaken initiatives to propose solutions towards a more sustainable
health system and Spain, as an example of a European country affected by austerity measures, is looking for ways
to cut healthcare budgets.
Methods: The aim of this paper is to study the effect of private health insurance on health care utilization using
the latest micro-data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), the Spanish National Health Survey
(SNHS) and the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). We use matching techniques
based on propensity score methods: single match, four matches, bias-adjustment and allowing for heteroskedasticity.
Results: The results demonstrate that people with a private health insurance, use the public health system less than
individuals without double health insurance coverage.
Conclusions: Our conclusions are useful when policy makers design public-private partnership policies.
Keywords: Health care utilization, Matching techniques, ECHP, SNHS, EU-SILC
Background
In recent years, and because of the economic crisis,
Spain’s government has been looking for ways to cut
healthcare budgets. The main goals are focused on redu-
cing health care expenditure, although patients have to
face long waiting lists for hospital admission, lack of
medical staff, greater co-payments or participation of the
patients in the costs according to the utilization of the ser-
vices in order to raise efficiency in health care provision.
In Spain, the right to health protection and care is laid
out in article 43 of the 1978 Constitution. Also, it is im-
portant to point out that the process of devolution of
health services available to the Autonomous Communi-
ties that had begun in 1981, concluded in 2001 (for fur-
ther information of the Spanish National Health System,
see the formal description made by the Ministry of
Health and Consumer Affairs [1]). In this regard, the
Spanish National Health System is organized in two levels:
“Primary Health Care” and “Specialist Care”. However,
access is gained by referral from Primary Health Care
(“gatekeeping system”).
The fast growth of expenditure on health care and its
relationship with health outcomes have been largely
studied in the European Union countries [2–4]. Now-
adays, the increase in health expenditure is considered
to a sign of a richer society looking for more health care.
Part of this increase is because of population aging and
technological improvements. In general, access to some
level of health care services in European countries is
universal for all individuals however they may opt for
private health insurance by taking out supplementary
coverage. Obviously, health care systems in European
countries differ in the source of financing, coverage and
means of delivering benefits, but they are also mainly fi-
nanced through taxation or contributions from em-
ployers and employees. This fact justifies the differences
between public and private health expenditure.
As a result, over the last few years, there has been a
vast amount of literature focus on health care financing
and expenditure. In fact, different stakeholders have also
undertaken initiatives to propose solutions towards a
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more sustainable health system. These are carried out
specially on studies analysing supplementary private
health insurance. Obviously, the expansion (or reduc-
tion) of double health insurance coverage has important
effects on health care utilization, spending and new
technologies [5, 6].
Bago d’Uva and Jones [7] conducted a study on health
in several European countries to study the differences in
the demand for health. They used the full dataset of the
ECHP, which lasted from 1994 until 2001. Using the same
dataset, Gonzalez and Clavero [8] concluded that the ma-
jority of differences in the number of visits to a general
practitioner are explained by the individual characteristics
of those insured, while the divergences in the number of
consultations with specialists are the result of the overuse
of this care by the population with double health insur-
ance coverage. Concerning visits to the general practi-
tioner, that inequality, in favor of those protected by the
public system is explained by the endowments of that
group and furthermore to an underutilization of this ser-
vice on the part of individuals who have double coverage.
In consultations with specialists, the inequality in favour
of the latter group is due to their overuse of the service.
Ayala and Rodríguez [9] tested whether participation in
work-related activities yields positive results in terms of
health outcomes and behaviors in Spain.
From another perspective, Urbanos-Garrido and
López-Valcarcel [10] estimated the effect of unemploy-
ment on the overall and mental health of the Spanish
working-age population. They apply matching tech-
niques to cross-sectional micro data for the Spanish
Health Survey concluding that the effect is particularly
high on the long-term unemployed. In fact, within a Na-
tional Health Insurance System, individuals who take
out private insurance are likely to be those who antici-
pate, based on private information, a higher than average
demand for health care [11, 12].
Barros et al. [13] studied the effect of extra health insur-
ance on the number of clinical visits. The case under
study is Portugal where there is a National Health System,
but the civil servants and their dependents have another
health insurance. The authors study whether having
double health coverage implies that such persons demand
more health services than those who only have one. The
methodology that they use is matching estimators to esti-
mate the effect on the number of visits to the doctor if
they have extra health insurance. In particular, they show
the results based on simple matching and biased adjusted
matching. They demonstrated that the effect of an extra
health insurance is positive and substantial. This effect is
more important for the youngest cohort.
The aim of this paper is to study the effect of private
health insurance on health care utilization in Spain using
the latest micro-data from the European Community
Household Panel (ECHP), the Spanish National Health
Survey (SNHS) and the European Union Statistics on In-
come and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). We also com-
bine SNHS and EU-SILC because of limitations of both
for the purpose of this study. Following the methodology
proposed by Arellano and Meghir [14], we provide stat-
istical evidence on the compatibility of the two samples.
Once we have combined both datasets, we study
whether having an extra health insurance policy affects
the number of times that health care is required. To
achieve this aim, we use matching techniques based on
propensity score methods. So, we are going to study the
effect on an individual’s use of healthcare when he or
she has purchased health insurance. Therefore, the prob-
lem is to identify the effect of a “treatment”. In this
sense, the causal effect of interest is the difference be-
tween the outcome with and without treatment. Obvi-
ously, an individual cannot be observed in these two
situations at the same time.
This paper uses policy evaluation techniques, namely
propensity score matching, to assess the extent to which
Spanish individuals with double health insurance coverage
use (general practitioner and specialist visits) more or less
health care than their counterparts who do not have such
coverage. Also, we derive the empirical results and discuss
our main findings as well as policy implications.
Methods
Relevance of double health insurance coverage
In Spain the National Health Service offers universal
coverage as a constitutionally-guaranteed right. Now-
adays, there are important problems such as the need to
control health spending growth, waiting lists, etc. It is,
therefore, necessary to evaluate policies with respect to
the measures taken to address these problems. One of
the solutions that has arisen to reduce both costs and
waiting lists is to use and finance private healthcare.
However, having double health insurance coverage may
increase the number of medical visits. In this case, we
state that there is moral hazard [15, 16]. However, there
are two types of moral hazard. When the individual
changes his/her behavior towards risk because it has
extra insurance this is termed ex-ante moral hazard.
And the other possibility is that people change their be-
havior because they have an extra insurance; they seek
medical advice in circumstances where if they did not
have that extra insurance policy they would not. This
may be another problem which has to be avoided to
control health care expenditure, so it is necessary to
study the behavior of individuals with private health in-
surance. Thus, comparing the effect of private and pub-
lic insurance on health care utilization is important, as
they complement each other, and also offers insight to
policy makers on the relevance of either insurance
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scheme. Also, the use of micro-data from varied sources
to arrive at a conclusion is important.
The use of health care services depends on the type of
insurance [17]. In fact, there is a positive effect of private
insurance on hospital in-patient services [18]. In
Portugal, for example, the effects of health insurance on
the number of clinical visits are substantial and positive
[13]. However, double coverage creates additional
utilization of health care across the whole outcome dis-
tribution [19]. In addition, private insurance in France
has a strong and significant effect on health care
utilization [20]. Besides, there are studies that compare
the effect of voluntary private health insurance among
different countries, using the out of pocket healthcare
spending as outcome. The results indicate that private
insurance is a strong incentive to spend more out of
pocket healthcare in Spain, Italy, Austria and Denmark
[21]. In the case of Spain, using data from the National
Health Survey of 1997, people with only public insur-
ance go 2.8 times to the general practitioner for each
time that they visit a specialist; individuals with double
coverage have a ratio of general practitioner/specialist
visits equal to 1.4 [22]. In the case of Catalonia (a Span-
ish Autonomous Community), there exists a positive ef-
fect of double coverage on visits to specialists among
non-heads of household [12]. From another point of
view, individuals with prescription drug insurance also
make more visits to the General Practitioner (GP) than
those who do not have that insurance [23]. Other studies
analyze the effect of co-payment rates and conclude that
a decrease in co-payment rates produces an increase in
the demand for health care services [24, 25]. In fact, vol-
untary health insurance provides complementary cover
for services excluded or not fully covered by the state as
well as faster access and enlarged consumer choice.
In addition, due to the economic crisis that has existed
since 2008, reducing health expenditure and waiting lists
is one of the greatest issues of importance for Spain. In
fact, unemployment has a negative effect on both Self-
Assessed Health (SAH) and mental health [26]. This ef-
fect is particularly high for the long-term unemployed. It
should be taken account that this crisis has produced a
decrease in public health expenditure by 7.2% in 2009 to
6.8% in 2011 [10]. However, private health expenditure
has increased from 2.4 to 2.5% in the same period of
time. Thus, the study of the potential reduction in health
care utilization associated with private insurance is a
point of great interest not only for policy makers but
also for the whole population.
Estimation techniques
In this study, we are interested in calculating the effect
of double health insurance coverage on health care
utilization. In particular, we want to study whether
individuals behave differently precisely because they have
a private health insurance. This is known as the average
treatment effect on treated. To estimate it, we applied
matching and propensity score methods that are based
on comparing two groups. On the one hand, in the first
group, there are individuals who have received treatment
and in the second one, called the control group, there
are those individuals who have not received treatment
but have similar characteristics to those who received it.
In particular, each individual from the first group is
paired with one or more individuals in the control
group. Let the variable w be a binary treatment indicator,
where w = 1 denotes treatment and w = 0 otherwise. We
have a random vector (y0, y1,w) from an individual of
the population of interest. Thus, the Average Treatment
Effect (ATE) on treated is defined as [27]:
ATE1 ¼ E y1−y0jw ¼ 1ð Þ
¼ E y1jw ¼ 1ð Þ−E y0jw ¼ 1ð Þ ð1Þ
where Y0 and Y1 represent health outcomes for individ-
uals who do not have private health insurance or those
who do, respectively..
We are going to define the causal effect in terms of
potential outcomes or counterfactuals [28]. We consider
an individual i. He or she can receive the treatment and
his/her outcome is y1. If he/she does not receive the
treatment, then his/her outcome is y0. Obviously, an in-
dividual cannot be in the two categories. Therefore, we
cannot observe both.
Thus, causal effects are comparisons of y0 and y1, for
example y1 − y0 or y1/y0 [27]. We will focus on measur-
ing y1 − y0. For this, we need to make an additional as-
sumption: We have an independent, identically
distributed sample from the population. This implies
that the treatment on individual i affects only to individ-
ual i, which is called the Stable Unit Treatment Value
Assumption (SUTVA). In most programs the individual
is the one who decides whether to participate. Thus
there is self-selection into treatment. If we assume that
w is independent of y0, we can estimate ATE1
consistently:
E yjw ¼ 1ð Þ−E yjw ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ E y0jw ¼ 1ð Þ−E y0jw ¼ 0ð Þ þ
þE y1−y0jw ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ E y0jw ¼ 1ð Þ−E y0jw ¼ 0ð Þ½  þ ATE1
ð2Þ
If it holds that
E y0jwð Þ ¼ E y0ð Þ; ð3Þ
substituting it in eq. (2) we have an unbiased estimator
of ATE1.
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When w and (y0, y1) are allowed to be correlated we
need the assumptions that Rosenbaum y Rubin proposed
[27] and which were called ignorability of treatment:
Assumption 1: Conditional on x, w and (y0, y1) are
independent.
Often it is enough to assume:
Assumption 2: a) E(y0| x, w) = E(y0| x) and b) E(y1| x,
w) = E(y1| x).
Under Assumption 2 the average treatment effect con-
ditional on x (ATE(x)) and the average treatment effect
of the treated conditional on x (ATE1(x)), are identical.
To estimate ATE1 we can use regression methods that
can be nonparametric and parametric. As we have a ran-
dom sample on (y,w, x) from the population, r1(x) ≡ E(y|
x,w = 1) and r0(x) ≡ E(y| x,w = 0) are no parametrically
identified. They are conditional expectations that depend
entirely on observables and they can be consistently
estimated.
In consequence, to apply matching methods we need
to accept Assumption 1, which is a particular case of a
balancing score. A balancing score is a function b(x) of
the observed covariates such that (y0, y1 ⊥w) ∣ b(x).
Thus, the simplest case of balancing score is b(x) = x.
To ensure compliance of Assumption 1, the vector of co-
variates x should contain all information affecting the
participation in the program and the variable that is be-
ing studied. One of the balancing scores most used is
the propensity score defined by Rosenbaum and Rubin
[27]. They demonstrated that if treatment assignment is
strongly ignorable, conditioning on the propensity score
allows one to obtain unbiased estimates of average treat-
ment effects.
Hence, a key point is to calculate the corresponding
propensity score. Let x be a set of covariates. The pro-
pensity score is the conditional probability of assignment
to treatment, given the covariates. We denote it as:
p xð Þ≡P w ¼ 1jxð Þ: ð4Þ
Once we have calculated the propensity score, we have
several methods for applying matching techniques. In
particular, we have used nearest-neighbor matching [29].
This method will match the individuals whose propen-
sity score shows the smallest difference. Let T be the set
of treated units and C the set of control units. Let C(i)
be the set of control units matched to the treated unit i
with an estimated value of the propensity score of pi,
nearest-neighbor matching sets:





In addition, to test the sensitivity of our results, we have
considered different estimators: one to-one propensity
score matching, using 4 matches, using 4 matches and
bias adjustment and finally allowing for heteroskedasticity.
Data description and exposure variables
Therefore, the idea of our empirical approach is as fol-
lows. Firstly, the data used in this paper are obtained
from the ECHP. This survey contains data on individuals
and households for the European Union countries with
eight waves available (1994 to 2001). The main advan-
tage is that information is homogeneous among coun-
tries since the questionnaire is similar throughout them.
This source of data is coordinated by the Statistical Of-
fice of the European Communities (EUROSTAT). Also,
this survey includes rich new information about income,
education, employment, health, etc. This representative
survey of households in different European Union coun-
tries was carried out for the first time in 1994 and
60,500 households were interviewed (approximately
170,000 individuals).
In order to determine the main socio-demographic
characteristics of people who have a private health insur-
ance, we have classified them into six groups of vari-
ables: personal and household characteristics, education
level, marital status, personal earnings, occupational sta-
tus and variables related to individuals’ health. Definition
of all the variables and the basic descriptive statistics are
shown in Table 1.
As personal characteristics we have included two vari-
ables: the individual’s age (in years) and gender (building
a dummy variable which takes value of 1 if individual is
female and 0 otherwise). To allow for a flexible relation-
ship between the probability of having private health in-
surance and AGE, a quadratic polynomial function of
this variable is included (AGE2 = Age^2). The second
group of variables refers to the maximum level of educa-
tion completed. In the ECHP, education is classified into
three categories based on ISCED classification: lower
than secondary level (ISCED 0–2), second stage of sec-
ondary level (ISCED 3) and third level (ISCED 5–7).
Thus, two dummy variables have been included: bellow
secondary level (EDUC1) and tertiary level education
(EDUC2). Thirdly, regarding marital status, we have
considered four variables (SINGLE, SEPARATED, DI-
VORCED and WIDOWED) with married as the refer-
ence category. On the other hand, we are concerned
with the influence of income on having private health in-
surance. Our income variable is a natural logarithm of
the individual’s wage (LOGWAGE). Other variables in-
cluded in the analysis related to the labor market are
employment status. We have considered a dummy vari-
able that takes value one if the individual is unemployed
and zero otherwise (UNEMPLOYMENT). Also, we have
considered other variables related to health status. We
have taken into account whether an individual has any
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chronic condition (CHRONIC), whether the individual
has been in hospital the previous year (HOSPITAL),
the number of visits to the doctor (NUMBER_VI-
SITS) and finally we have considered individuals’
SAH. We have defined two dummy variables: FAIR_-
HEALTH (1 if individual’s SAH is fair and 0 other-
wise) and BAD_HEALTH (1 if individual’s SAH is
bad or very bad and 0 otherwise). Moreover, we have
incorporated another dummy variable which takes
value 1 if the individual smokes daily or occasionally
(SMOKER). Finally, we have defined another dummy
variable that indicates whether the individual has pri-
vate health insurance (PRIVATE_INSURANCE).
The effect of double health insurance coverage has
been researched using information from another two
independent sources: the European Union Statistics on
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC, 2011 and
2012) and the Spanish National Health Survey (SNHS)
(2011/2012). The EU-SILC contains data on individuals
and households for European Union countries. It is
published annually and the main advantage is that in-
formation is homogeneous among countries since the
Table 1 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics using the ECHP
2001 2000 1999 1998
Name Definition Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Personal Characteristics
FEMALE 1 if female, 0 otherwise 0.5202 0.4996 0.5193 0.4996 0.5198 0.4996 0.5181 0.4997
AGE Individual’s age 46.2874 19.6670 45.9765 19.6249 45.6354 19.5239 45.2911 19.4838
Education
EDUC1 1 if less than secondary level
(ISCED 0–2), 0 otherwise
0.4273 0.4947 0.4378 0.4961 0.4399 0.4964 0.4417 0.4966
EDUC2 1 if third level education
(ISCED 5–7)
0.1319 0.3384 0.1278 0.3339 0.1211 0.3263 0.1161 0.3203
Marital Status
SINGLE 1 if single, 0 otherwise 0.3001 0.4583 0.3032 0.4596 0.3071 0.4613 0.3088 0.4620
SEPARATED 1 if separated, 0 otherwise 0.0144 0.1190 0.0152 0.1223 0.0150 0.1214 0.0150 0.1216
DIVORCED 1 if divorced, 0 otherwise 0.0097 0.0980 0.0095 0.0970 0.0085 0.0921 0.0081 0.0894
WIDOW 1 if widowed, 0 otherwise 0.0893 0.2851 0.0891 0.2848 0.0857 0.2799 0.0867 0.2814
MARRIED 1 if married, 0 otherwise 0.5866 0.4925 0.5831 0.4931 0.5837 0.4930 0.5814 0.4933
Personal Earnings
LOGWAGE Natural logarithm of the
individual’s earnings
8.5711 1.5986 8.4468 1.7219 8.4794 1.5669 8.3946 1.5878
Employment
UNEMPLOYMENT 1 if unemployed, 0 otherwise 0.0605 0.2385 0.0640 0.2447 0.0709 0.2567 0.0855 0.2796
Health Status
SMOKE 1 if individual is a smoker,
0 otherwise
0.3232 0.4677 0.3245 0.4682 0.3370 0.4727 0.3475 0.4762
NUMBER_VISITS1 Number of visits to general
practitioner
4.0828 6.9875 3.5232 5.6475 3.6494 6.1505 3.8179 6.6565
NUMBER_VISITS2 Number of visits to specialist
doctors in the previous year
1.7091 4.0508 1.5690 3.4261 1.5577 3.7921 1.6237 3.7099
HOSPITAL 1 if individual has been hospitalized
in the previous year, 0 otherwise
0.0871 0.2819 0.0792 0.2700 0.0789 0.2696 0.0828 0.2756
FAIR_HEALTH 1 if individual’s self-assessed health
is fair, 0 otherwise
0.2178 0.4127 0.2018 0.4014 0.2057 0.4043 0.2082 0.4060
BAD_HEALTH 1 if individual’s self-assessed health
is bad or very bad, 0 otherwise
0.1056 0.3074 0.1099 0.3128 0.1024 0.3032 0.1164 0.3207
CHRONIC 1 if individual is an chronic sick,
0 otherwise
0.2301 0.4209 0.2144 0.4104 0.2196 0.4140 0.2369 0.4252
PRIVATE_INSURANCE 1 if individual has private insurance,
0 otherwise
0.1157 0.3199 0.0970 0.2960 0.0980 0.2973 0.1003 0.3004
Source: Authors’ elaboration
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questionnaire is similar throughout them and coordi-
nated by EUROSTAT. Also, this survey includes rich
new information about income, education, employ-
ment, health, etc. On the other hand, the SNHS pro-
vides general information on the health of the
Spanish population in order to plan and evaluate in-
terventions in health. The 2011–2012 survey consists
of approximately 24,000 dwellings and it includes in-
formation on assessment of general, physical and
mental health, and it identifies the main problems
that citizens feel (chronic diseases, ailments, acci-
dents, limitations to performance of activities of daily
living, etc.). The two surveys are complementary in
the way that they both contain demographic charac-
teristics, education, health status, etc. In fact, the def-
inition of most of the variables in the two
questionnaires is similar but only the EU-SILC con-
tains information about income and only the SNHS
includes information about the number of visits to
general practitioners or specialist doctors, type of
health insurance and lifestyle characteristics. Thus, in-
come information is obtained from EU-SILC, while infor-
mation of health status is obtained from SNHS.
Obviously, both surveys refer to the same period of time.
In order to establish the main socio-demographic char-
acteristics of people who have a private health insurance,
we have classified them into four groups of variables: per-
sonal characteristics, marital status, variables related to in-
dividuals’ health and income. Table 2 shows explanatory
variables used in estimations and their corresponding defi-
nitions. Firstly, as personal characteristics we have in-
cluded two variables: the individual’s age (in years) and
sex (building a dummy variable which takes value of 1 if
individual is male and 0 otherwise). To allow for a flexible
relationship between the probability of having a private
health insurance and AGE, a quadratic polynomial func-
tion of this variable is included (AGE2). Secondly, regard-
ing marital status, we have considered three variables
Table 2 Variable names and descriptive statistics using the EU-SILC (2011 and 2012) and the SNHS (2011/12)
Variable Variable description EU-SILC (2011) EU-SILC (2012) SNHS (2011/2012)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
MALE 1 if male, 0 otherwise 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.46 0.5
AGE Individual’s age (years) 49.66 18.7 50.04 18.76 51.6 19.09
SINGLE 1 if single, 0 otherwise 0.29 0.45 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.45
SEPARATED_DIVORCED 1 if separated or divorced 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.25
WIDOW 1 if widow, 0 otherwise 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.13 0.34
MARRIED 1 if married, 0 otherwise 0.58 0.49 0.57 0.50 0.52 0.50
EARNINGS Individual’s earnings 6445.47 9962.39 6147.71 9746.15 – –
SMOKE 1 if smoker, 0 otherwise – – – – 0.25 0.43
DRINK 1 if consumes alcohol regularly,
0 otherwise
– – – – 0.49 0.50
OBESE 1 if obese, 0 otherwise – – – – 0.39 0.49
CHRONIC 1 if chronic condition,
0 otherwise
0.25 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.47 0.50
LIMIT 1 if, individual has a limitation,
0 otherwise
0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.42
GOOD_HEALTH 1 if good or very good SAH,
0 otherwise
0.73 0.44 0.72 0.45 0.68 0.47
BAD_HEALTH 1 if bad or very bad SAH,
0 otherwise
0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29
NUMBER_VISITS_GENERAL Number of visits to general
practitioner in last 4 weeks
– – – – 1.31 0.87
NUMBER_VISITS_SPECIALIST Number of visits to specialist
doctor in last 4 weeks
– – – – 1.33 1.08
PRIVATE_INSURANCE_INDIVIDUAL 1 if individual has private
insurance taken out by him,
0 otherwise
– – – – 0.09 0.29
PRIVATE_INSURANCE_COMPANY 1 if individual has private
insurance taken out by his
company, 0 otherwise
– – – – 0.02 0.15
Source: Authors’ elaboration
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(SINGLE, SEPARATED_DIVORCED and WIDOWED)
with married as the reference category.
Also, we have considered different variables related to
health status. We have taken into account whether an
individual has a chronic condition (CHRONIC) or limi-
tation in his/her life (LIMIT), the number of visits to the
general practitioner (NUMBER_VISITS_GENERAL) and
the number of visits to the specialist (NUMBER_VI-
SITS_SPECIALIST). Also, we have considered individ-
uals’ Self-Assessed Health (SAH) and we have defined
two dummy variables: GOOD_HEALTH (1 if individual’s
SAH is good or very good, 0 otherwise) and BAD_-
HEALTH (1 if individual’s SAH is bad or very bad, 0
otherwise), leaving fair health as the reference category.
In addition, we have incorporated another dummy vari-
able which takes value 1 if individual smokes daily or oc-
casionally (SMOKER). In addition, DRINK and OBESE
are two dummy variables. They indicate whether the in-
dividual consumes alcohol regularly and whether he/she
is obese (Body Mass Index greater than 30), respectively.
Besides, we have defined two dummy variables that
indicate whether the individual has private health
insurance taken out by him/herself (PRIVATE_INSUR-
ANCE_INDIVIDUAL) or by the company (PRIVATE_
INSURANCE_COMPANY).
Finally, as pointed out before, we are concerned with
the influence of income on having a private health insur-
ance. The problem is that the SNHS does not contain
information about income. For this reason, this informa-
tion has to be obtained from the EU-SILC. It is worth
noting that the composition of both samples does not
differ very much.
Also, the data do make clear that those individuals
who have private health insurance (taken out by them-
selves or their company), use public health system less
than individuals without double health insurance cover-
age. In this sense, it is important to notice that in Spain,
it is not usual to have at the same time individual private
insurance and private insurance taken out by the com-
pany. In fact, in our surveys, this option is not consid-
ered. In Table 3, we can see that 67.21% of individuals
who have private health insurance taken out by
Table 3 Level of healthcare services utilization by type of health coverage and functional dependence of the doctor
Private insurance taken out by the individual Functional dependence General practitioner Specialist
Percentage Percentage
Yes Public Health 67.21 41.79
Medical society 11.89 21.21
Private Consultation 18.24 35.55
Others 2.66 1.46
No Public Health 95.98 88.82
Medical society 1.31 3.1
Private Consultation 1.92 6.86
Others 0.78 1.22
Private insurance taken out by the company Functional dependence General practitioner Specialist
Percentage Percentage
Yes Public Health 76.99 41.30
Medical society 7.96 19.57
Private Consultation 11.50 27.17
Others 3.54 11.96
No Public Health 94.13 83.22
Medical society 2.00 5.31
Private Consultation 3.00 10.52
Others 0.87 0.95
No Private insurance Functional dependence General practitioner Specialist
Percentage Percentage
Public Health 100 74,90
Medical society 0 0,91
Private Consultation 0 23,78
Others 0 0,41
Source: Author’s elaboration based on SNHS (2011/2012)
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themselves went to a public general practitioner on their
last visit (41.79% to a specialist doctor), while those per-
centages are 95.98 and 88.82% for individuals who do
not have private health insurance. Moreover, the behav-
ior is similar when the private health insurance is taken
out by the company. As Table 3 shows, 76.99% of indi-
viduals who have private health insurance taken out by
the company went to a public general practitioner on
their last visit (41.30% to a specialist doctor) while those
percentages are 94.13 and 83.22% for individuals who do
not have such insurance.
Results
We focus on those characteristics which could explain
an individual having private health insurance [8]. A set
of factors gathered in a vector x explain this fact so the
probability model is a regression:
E yjxð Þ ¼ F x; βð Þ: ð6Þ
The set of parameters β reflects the effect of changes
in x on the probability. In order to estimate this equa-
tion, a nonlinear specification of F(.) can avoid logical in-
consistency and the possibility of predicted probabilities
outside the range [0, 1]. The most common nonlinear
parametric specifications are logit and probit models
which have been analysed, and we use a latent variable
interpretation.
Table 4 shows the results of the probit equation for
the years 1998 to 2001. The aim is to model the prob-
ability of an individual having private health insurance
as a function of socioeconomic characteristics. To inter-
pret the quantitative implications of these findings, we
compute average and partial effects. According to this,
results seem to be similar every year. The unemploy-
ment coefficient is always negative. So, as expected, an
unemployed person is less likely to have private health
insurance than a person who is working. On the other
hand EDUC2 coefficient is positive, which confirms that
the level of education is highly correlated with double
health insurance coverage.
Moreover, we want to analyse the effect of double
health insurance coverage on health care utilization. In
particular, we wish to study whether individuals behave
differently precisely because they have private health in-
surance. We are going to estimate the average treatment
effect and the average treatment effect on those treated.
To calculate the average treatment effect on those
treated we have used four different matching models:
single match, four matches, bias-adjustment and allow-
ing for heteroskedasticity. Table 5 shows the results
based on the ECHP. The first estimator that we have
considered in row one is the One to One propensity
score matching. We find that the difference between the
matched treated and the matched controls is −0.2779 in
2001, −0.1418 in 2000, −0.1235 in 1999 and −0.6379 in
1998 while the Z-statistics for H0 are −1.22, −0.72, −0.54
and −2.83, respectively for ATE1 on visits to the general
practitioner. On the other hand, we find that when we
analyse ATE1 on visits to a specialist, the difference be-
tween the matched treated and the matched controls is
0.7933 in 2001, 0.6691 in 2000, 1.0283 in 1999 and
0.6900 in 1998. By using four matches, results are quite
similar either for visits to a general practitioner or visits
to a specialist. We choose it because in this way we do
not rely on too few information-matching observations
that are not sufficiently similar.
For all the specifications at hand, we can conclude that
the ATE1s are significantly different from zero at the 1%
level when we are considering the effect of private health
insurance on specialist visits whereas the ATE1s are not
always significant when we consider as outcome “Visits
to general practitioner”. It depends on the year and the
estimator considered. Similar findings are obtained when
we use the bias-corrected matching estimator or allow-
ing for heteroskedasticity. It adjusts the difference within
the matches for the differences in their covariate values
where the last method estimates the standard error
allowing for heteroskedasticity. Our results show that
when the standard error is estimated under these weaker
conditions the estimated ATE1 is always significant at
the 1% level.
As we are interested in expanding this analysis to the
next years (note that ECHP is only available till 2001),
we have combined EU-SILC and SNHS using the model
described by Arellano and Meghir [14]. We have a first
sample which is not enough to identify the parameter of
interest and a second one which includes information
on additional variables and provides the complementary
number of variables that are necessary to identify our
parameters of interest. For this purpose, we have esti-
mated personal income by using the EU-SILC calculated
by the following model:
w ¼ β0 þ
XK
k¼1
βkXk þ ε; ð7Þ
where w corresponds to the logarithm of individual’s
earnings, Xk and ε are the k-th explanatory variable and
a random error term, respectively. This methodology is
based on regression analysis, and departs from Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) estimation of a logarithmic individ-
ual wage equation. Once personal income is estimated,
we have allocated it to the SNHS (2011/2012).
Thus, we are going to estimate the effect of having pri-
vate health insurance (double health insurance coverage)
on general practitioner and specialist visits. Table 6 re-
ports the ATE1 estimates for 2011 and 2012 in the case
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where private insurance is taken out by individual or by
the company, respectively. Also, to test the robustness of
our results, we have combined EU-SILC (2011) with
SNHS (2011/2012) and have combined EU-SILC (2012)
with SNHS (2011/2012). To calculate the average treat-
ment effect on the treated we have used nearest neigh-
bor matching. As can be noticed, double health coverage
produces an increase on the number of visits to the spe-
cialist doctor and on the number of consultations with
the general practitioner on those individuals who have
taken out private insurance. The results indicate that for
the individuals in our sample, the average effect of hav-
ing private health insurance (taken out by the individual
or by the company) is an increase in the number of
Table 4 Probit Estimates
2001 2000
Coef. Std. Err. z P > |z| dF/dx Coef. Std. Err. z P > |z| dF/dx
AGE 0.0053 0.0014 3.7900 0.0000 0.0009 0.0069 0.0015 4.6500 0.0000 0.0010
FEMALE 0.0048 0.0373 0.1300 0.8970 0.0008 0.0620 0.0394 1.5700 0.1160 0.0093
UNEMPLOYMENT −0.4790 0.0967 −4.9600 0.0000 −0.0622 −0.3185 0.0919 −3.4600 0.0010 −0.0389
WAGE 0.0235 0.0122 1.9200 0.0550 0.0040 0.0353 0.0125 2.8200 0.0050 0.0053
EDUC1 −0.6691 0.0547 −12.2400 0.0000 −0.1094 −0.6647 0.0570 −11.6600 0.0000 −0.0958
EDUC2 0.4817 0.0451 10.6700 0.0000 0.1022 0.4790 0.0473 10.1200 0.0000 0.0902
FAIR_HEALTH −0.0769 0.0517 −1.4900 0.1370 −0.0129 −0.1284 0.0568 −2.2600 0.0240 −0.0182
BAD_HEALTH −0.3872 0.0899 −4.3100 0.0000 −0.0546 −0.3551 0.0905 −3.9300 0.0000 −0.0438
CHRONIC 0.0234 0.0553 0.4200 0.6730 0.0041 0.1204 0.0582 2.0700 0.0390 0.0188
HOSPITAL 0.1440 0.0648 2.2200 0.0260 0.0267 0.1489 0.0693 2.1500 0.0320 0.0242
SMOKE −0.0509 0.0386 −1.3200 0.1880 −0.0087 0.0041 0.0403 0.1000 0.9180 0.0006
MARRIED 0.1444 0.0381 3.7900 0.0000 0.0245 0.1716 0.0401 4.2800 0.0000 0.0252
_cons −1.5293 0.1110 −13.7800 0.0000 −1.8762 0.1144 −16.4000 0.0000
Numb. of obs 9507.0000 9558.0000
Log likelihood −3134.2760 −2798.6910
Pseudo R2 0.0927 0.0904
1999 1998
Coef. Std. Err. z P > |z| dF/dx Coef. Std. Err. z P > |z| dF/dx
AGE 0.0065 0.0014 4.5200 0.0000 0.0010 0.0079 0.0014 5.6600 0.0000 0.0013
FEMALE 0.0598 0.0388 1.5400 0.1230 0.0093 0.0364 0.0374 0.9700 0.3300 0.0060
UNEMPLOYMENT −0.3352 0.0892 −3.7600 0.0000 −0.0423 −0.2565 0.0750 −3.4200 0.0010 −0.0363
WAGE 0.0433 0.0135 3.1900 0.0010 0.0067 0.0145 0.0121 1.2000 0.2300 0.0024
EDUC1 −0.6338 0.0560 −11.3300 0.0000 −0.0950 −0.6165 0.0529 −11.6400 0.0000 −0.0983
EDUC2 0.4106 0.0478 8.5900 0.0000 0.0775 0.4479 0.0473 9.4700 0.0000 0.0907
FAIR_HEALTH −0.1227 0.0552 −2.2200 0.0260 −0.0181 −0.1618 0.0524 −3.0900 0.0020 −0.0249
BAD_HEALTH −0.4180 0.0925 −4.5200 0.0000 −0.0516 −0.3484 0.0821 −4.2400 0.0000 −0.0478
CHRONIC 0.0597 0.0574 1.0400 0.2980 0.0094 0.0406 0.0539 0.7500 0.4520 0.0067
HOSPITAL 0.2436 0.0666 3.6600 0.0000 0.0432 0.0447 0.0660 0.6800 0.4980 0.0075
SMOKE −0.0487 0.0398 −1.2200 0.2210 −0.0075 −0.0216 0.0382 −0.5700 0.5710 −0.0035
MARRIED 0.1271 0.0393 3.2300 0.0010 0.0194 0.0910 0.0381 2.3900 0.0170 0.0148
_cons −1.8484 0.1200 −15.4000 0.0000 −1.5825 0.1056 −14.9900 0.0000
Numb. of obs 9619.0000 9934.0000
Log likelihood −2899.6812 −3116.5375
Pseudo R2 0.0830 0.0744
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. z and P > |z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0
Source: Author’s elaboration from ECHP
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consultations with general practitioner and specialist.
The estimated ATE1 is always statistically significant ran-
ging between 0.069 and 0.13 for the visits to the general
practitioner and between 0.067 and 0.112 for the visits
to specialist doctors.
Obviously, we are assuming that potential outcomes
are independent of treatment assignment (un-confound-
edness). Therefore, selection is based on observable
characteristics and all variables in which influence treat-
ment assignment and potential outcomes are observed
simultaneously [30]. However, a further requirement be-
sides independence is the common support or overlap
condition. Figure 1 shows the propensity score histo-
gram by treatment status and as can be noticed, we do
not have overlap problems. Above the horizontal line is
the propensity score histogram of the control group
(w = 0) and below, the treatment one (w = 1). The histo-
gram shows how many treated and control units are
matched within each propensity score stratum. As long
as there are at least as many untreated units as there are
treated units, we can match both using neighbor algo-
rithm. Moreover, another point of interest is the one re-
lated with potential endogeneity problems. These issues
may arise by the way in which the relevant health status
is observed in social surveys. However, we have assumed
exogeneity of health indicators based on the results ob-
tained by Urbanos et al. [10], Kreider [31] and Linde-
boom et al. [32]. In fact, it is assumed that the effect of
taking out private health insurance on health status is a
gradual process rather than an instantaneous effect.
Table 5 Matching and regression estimates of the effect of private health insurance on general practitioner and specialist visits
2001 Visits to general practitioner Visits to specialists
ATE1 Std. Err. Z P > |z| ATE1 Std. Err. t P > |z
m = 1 −0.2779 0.2279 −1.22 0.223 0.7933 0.2070 3.83 0.000
m = 4 −0.3132 0.1668 −1.88 0.060 0.7710 0.1569 4.91 0.000
m = 4 and bias-adjustment −0.3207 0.1668 −1.92 0.055 0.7738 0.1569 4.93 0.000
m = 4 and allowing for heterokedasticity −0.3207 0.1618 −1.98 0.048 0.7738 0.1696 4.56 0.000
n 9557 9558
2000 Visits to general practitioner Visits to specialists
ATE1 Std. Err. Z P > |z| ATE1 Std. Err. t P > |z
m = 1 −0.1418 0.1977 −0.72 0.473 0.6691 0.1597 4.19 0.000
m = 4 −0.2907 0.1651 −1.76 0.078 0.5844 0.1314 4.45 0.000
m = 4 and bias-adjustment −0.2917 0.1650 −1.77 0.077 0.5850 0.1314 4.45 0.000
m = 4 and allowing for heterokedasticity −0.2917 0.1499 −1.50 0.052 0.5850 0.1383 4.23 0.000
n 9745
1999 Visits to general practitioner Visits to specialists
ATE1 Std. Err. Z P > |z| ATE1 Std. Err. t P > |z
m = 1 −0.1235 0.2272 −0.54 0.587 1.0283 0.1743 5.90 0.000
m = 4 −0.1573 0.1795 −0.88 0.381 0.9280 0.1418 6.55 0.000
m = 4 and bias-adjustment −0.1685 0.1793 −0.94 0.347 0.9274 0.1418 6.54 0.000
m = 4 and allowing for heterokedasticity −0.1685 0.1821 −0.93 0.355 0.9274 0.1294 7.17 0.000
n 10,008 10,006
1998 Visits to general practitioner Visits to specialists
ATE1 Std. Err. Z P > |z| ATE1 Std. Err. t P > |z
m = 1 −0.6379 0.2257 −2.83 0.005 0.6900 0.1694 4.07 0.000
m = 4 −0.5274 0.1794 −2.94 0.003 0.7624 0.1367 5.58 0.000
m = 4 and bias-adjustment −0.5398 0.1792 −3.01 0.003 0.7633 0.1368 5.58 0.000
m = 4 and allowing for heterokedasticity −0.5398 0.1794 −3.01 0.003 0.7633 0.1224 6.24 0.000
n 10,249 10,253
Source: Author’s elaboration from ECHP
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Discussion
This paper attempts to assess the importance of the ef-
fect of private health insurance on the use of health care
services (visits to General Practitioners and specialist
doctors) based on Spanish data. First of all, using the
ECHP and applying public evaluation policy techniques,
we have studied whether there are differences in the
number of visits to specialists (mainly preceded by visits
to general practitioners) and general practitioners be-
tween individuals with different healthcare coverage
through additional affiliation to mutual or private health
insurance companies. In this sense, there is no empirical
evidence of an overutilization of health care by the
population with double health insurance coverage. We
have used matching techniques to estimate the average
treatment effect on those treated who have private
health insurance on the number of medical visits. We
replicate a randomized experiment by looking for treated
and control groups with similar covariate distributions.
This goal has been achieved by choosing well-matched
samples of the original treated and control groups,
thereby reducing bias due to the covariates.
Besides, we show that using more recent data, in
Spain, 12.45% of the population had mixed health care
coverage (SNHS, 2011–12). This refers to those persons
who have at the same time both public and private
health care coverage. Private medical insurance allows
individuals to avoid waiting lists and receive fast-track
consultations. In order to analyze such “extra-coverage”
we rely on propensity score methods. The results of all
models are quite similar and they show that the effect of
having a private health insurance on the visits to general
practitioner on those who have private health insurance
is an increase in the number of consultations by 0.069 to
0.13 and its effect on the number of visits in the special-
ist doctor is a variation of consultations by 0.067 to
0.112. We have also found differences depending on
whether the health insurance is taken out by the individ-
ual or by the company.
Conclusions
By using a large data sample, we conclude that having
double health insurance coverage has an important ef-
fect on health care utilization in Spain which suggests
that promoting private health insurance can yield a de-
crease in waiting lists and public health expenditure
even though it could damage the most vulnerable popu-
lation groups and disadvantaged social classes, enhan-
cing something undesirable: the inequality gap.
Overall, our study has shown that evaluation of public
policies is important not only because it provides feed-
back on the efficiency, effectiveness and performance of
public policies but it can also be critical to policy
Fig. 1 Propensity score histogram by treatment
Table 6 ATE1 (m = 1) on the number of consultations with General Practitioner and specialists by type of private insurance (taken
out by the individual or taken out by the company) using SNHS (2011/2012) and EU-SILC (2011 and 2012)
2011
Visits to General Practitioner Visits to specialists
Type of private insurance N. treat. N. contr. ATE1 Std. Err. t N. treat. N. contr. ATE1 Std. Err. t
Taken out by the individual 1993 3122 0.131 0.022 6.035 1993 1394 0.109 0.021 5.149
Taken out by the company 508 1239 0.069 0.031 2.224 508 637 0.067 0.036 1.851
Undifferentiated 2501 3163 0.121 0.019 6.232 2501 1402 0.101 0.020 5.073
2012
Visits to General Practitioner Visits to specialists
Type of private insurance N. treat. N. contr. ATE1 Std. Err. t N. treat. N. contr. ATE1 Std. Err. t
Taken out by the individual 1993 3106 0.130 0.022 5.988 1993 1390 0.112 0.021 5.341
Taken out by the company 508 1231 0.078 0.031 2.485 508 632 0.070 0.036 1.916
Undifferentiated 2501 3166 0.126 0.019 6.503 2501 1405 0.080 0.021 3.790
Source: Author’s elaboration based on SNHS and EU-SILC
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improvement and innovation. Indeed, our results are
very useful when policy makers design public-private
partnership policies that could benefit the whole popula-
tion. In this sense, it is important to study whether pro-
moting private medical insurance would reduce waiting
lists and increase self-assessed health. In fact, new de-
ductions on taxes could be an alternative to promote
private health insurance.
In Spain, as a result of the economic situation, there
exists an important problem regarding “long waiting
lists” for non-urgent medical care, in diagnostic or thera-
peutic procedures. In this sense, it is important to study
whether promoting private medical insurance would re-
duce waiting lists and increase self-assessed health [33,
34]. Therefore, evaluation of economic policies provides
feedback on their efficiency, effectiveness and perform-
ance and can be critical to policy improvement and
innovation.
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